Basic
Worldview:
103
Science, the Bible,
and Creation
Origins
- Section One:
Introduction and the Basics
Origins - Section One: Introduction
and the Basics
Origins - Section Two: Premature
Dismissals
Origins - Section Two: Application
of the Basics
Origins - Section Three: Creation
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Origin of Life
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Environment for Life 1
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Environment for Life 2
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Another Planet
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Origin of Species
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Speciation Factors
Origins - Section Three: Evolution,
Speciation Rates
Origins - Section Four: Time and
Age, Redshift
Origins - Section Four: Philosophical
Preference
Origins - Section Four: Cosmological
Model 1
Origins - Section Four: Cosmological
Model 2
Origins - Section Four: Dating Methods,
Perceptions, Basics
Origins - Section Four: Global Flood
Evidence
Origins - Section Four: Relative
Dating
Origins - Section Four: Dating and
Circular Reasoning
Origins - Section Four: The Geologic
Column
Origins - Section Four: Radiometric
Dating Basics
Origins - Section Four: General
Radiometric Problems
Origins - Section Four: Carbon-14
Problems
Origins - Section Four: Remaining
Methods and Decay Rates
Origins - Section Four: Radiometric
Conclusions, Other Methods
Origins - Section Five: Overall
Conclusions, Closing Editorial
Origins - Section Five: List
of Evidences Table
Origins Debate Figures and
Illustrations
Section One – Introduction: Plotting the Road
Ahead
In
this study we will take a closer look at the debate between
evolution and creationism concerning the origin of the universe,
the origin of life, and the origin of species. As we discuss
these topics, the study will be broken down into 4 main sections.
1.)
The first section contains the introduction and a discussion
of the elements necessary for clarity in communication and
debate. This section is essential if there is going to be
any productive analysis of the issues involved in this topic.
2.)
The second section contains a preliminary application of those
elements for clarity to some of the common objections and
perceptions in the origins debate. This section is essential
for overcoming the initial entrenchment and gridlock that
typically short-circuit the origins debate before it gets
underway.
3.)
The third section contains a presentation defining and establishing
the actual competing theories in the origins debate, evolution
and creation. This section is essential to the primary goal
of this study, which is to understand where the individual
pieces or aspects of evidence fit into, support, or oppose
the two positions. If we do not know exactly what the theories
are, then it is impossible to keep track of whether or not
they are actually supported by particular evidences and how
the evidence fits into the overall framework of the theory
as a whole.
4.)
The fourth section contains the actual presentation of the
evidence. This section is essential because once the two competing
theories are defined, the evidence should speak for itself
to clearly identify which theory is actually more scientific
and more scientifically valid.
Finally,
the study will conclude with a summary of the evidence in
qualitative terms and an additional closing thought designed
to provide a critical comparison illuminating the essential,
qualitative difference between the two theories.
General Methodology and Approach: A
Road Well-Traveled
We
begin this article with full knowledge that we are heading
off on a road, which has already been traveled by a host of
writers, researchers, scientists, theologians, philosophers,
atheists, agnostics, Christians, professionals, students,
evolutionists, and creationists. Our goal here is not to tread
any new ground. Nor is our goal to reinvent the wheel. Instead,
our goal is to bring precision to what too often may seem
to be a swirling barrage of claims and counterclaims.
Our
goal is clarity.
Clarity
is typically not a matter of making assertions and rebuttals,
but a matter of understanding where each assertion and rebuttal
fits into the larger framework of the overall argument. What
role does each point play in the ladder of the debate? Answering
that question is the purpose of this study: too capture each
point in its proper position in the greater whole and to display
the relative impact and outcome each point has on that greater
whole.
Since
this is the case, we will not be presenting any new, or novel,
evidences or arguments here. Instead, once the framework of
each theory is established, our approach will be to explain
the evidence and the positions as briefly as possible in order
to accomplish the larger goal of understanding the overall
debate. The intended effect of this approach will roughly
fit the description of keeping tabs on where things stand
in the debate as a result of each point. Metaphorically speaking,
this study should operate as a sort of running tally providing
a snapshot of the current standings.
To
reiterate before moving ahead, our basic strategy and intentions
can be summarized as follows:
1.)
First, to keep track of where each point fits into the larger
scope of the debate.
2.) And second,
to keep track of the relative impact that each point has on
the status of the debate.
Furthermore,
it is important to state that achieving clarity in a debate
is primarily a matter of achieving clarity concerning the
implications of the evidence. But clarity concerning the implications
of the evidence is not possible without a fundamental understanding
about debate and the examination of ideas. Without these principles,
clarity and reasonable (i.e. logical) comparison between concepts
is not possible, nor is good communication between opposing
parties, a better understanding of an opposing view, or effective
persuasion. All are impossible apart from certain decisions
that intelligent persons make when entering into difficult
discussions or examinations. And for the purpose of achieving
an effective comparison of the competing views on this topic,
the remainder of this introduction has been broken down into
the following 7 essential elements for clarity and effective
examination.
1.) Equity: If Not a Fresh Start, At Least a
Fair Start
2.) Giving the Evidence a Chance to Speak
3.) The Origin of Theories
4.) Evidence and Interpretation
5.) Identifying Direction
6.) Proof by Presupposition and Characterization
7.) Identifying and Assessing Explanatory Amendments
1.) Equity: If Not a Fresh Start, At Least a
Fair Start
As
we said during the introductory paragraphs above, the intent
of this study is to identify where each point fits and the
impact that it has in the larger framework of the overall
arguments. To do so, we need to describe each of the competing
positions with equity. The emphasis here is the objective
choice to use equity.
By
equity, we do not mean that all arguments or interpretations
are equal, equally reasonable, or equally valid. By equity,
we mean that the examination of the evidence, the presentation,
and any debate or discourse must be conducted with equity.
Rules and standards must be applied equally. Criticism and
scrutiny must be applied equally. Terms must be used consistently.
In short, what we mean is equity in procedure. Then, after
the debate and analysis have run their course, the competing
positions can truly be valued as either better or worse than
one another, because the assessment process will have been
conducted with equity.
Such
equity is a choice of the objective mind. It is the choice
not to raise straw men arguments in the attempt to win a debate
by painting a weaker version of your opponent, one that is
much more easily defeated. It is the choice to actually let
the evidence be heard and presented. And it is a choice to
actually let your opponent present his case.
Lack
of equity usually starts with the desire to dismiss an opponent
quickly either without or before actually having to examine
the evidence or positions for what they are. The goal is to
get the other side thrown out of the match or disqualified
before you actually have to begin the examination. Or, at
the very least, to get the audience either favoring your character
or distrusting your opponent’s character before the
contest begins.
There
are many ways to achieve a premature dismissal of the opposition
without having to examine the evidence. However, two in particular
are worthy of comment due to the fact that they are common
to this particular subject of origins and evolution.
The
first strategy takes aim at the opponent’s conclusions.
It involves painting your opponent as though his defeat has
already taken place, as though his conclusions have already
been decisively disproved. Along these lines, it may even
be suggested that the opponent has merely reinvented himself
superficially in order to cover up or distance himself from
a conclusive prior defeat. Consequently, since his defeat
has already been established, there is no need to discuss
or examine the evidence again at the present time. Metaphorically
speaking, this strategy attempts to disqualify an opponent
on the grounds that he’s already been beaten and, therefore,
is no longer an eligible challenger.
Let’s
take this out of the realm of the abstract by putting a familiar
face on it. In debates about origins and evolution, the suggestion
is sometimes made that modern creationism, and perhaps even
more specifically intelligent design theory, is simply a new
veneer, an updated, trendier, and more acceptable face for
an already defeated foe. On this note, one of the benefits
of our format is that, in reviewing the evidence itself, we
will also be able to examine exactly when any alleged defeat
of creationism occurred and by what evidence. Furthermore,
this approach of portraying your opponent as a slicker package
for an obvious error has the following effect. The more rational
that your opponent sounds and the better his arguments and
his presentation of the evidence become, the more the audience
will suspect him as adept at causing confusion or deception
rather than being convinced by his proofs.
The
second strategy takes aim at the opponent’s methodology.
It involves painting your opponent’s approach itself
as invalid. It can even involve suggesting that the opponent
is being misleading about who he is or why he believes what
he does. Consequently, since the opponent builds his arguments
in a manner that is either inappropriate or based upon unsound
reasoning, there is no value in wasting everyone’s time
by letting the opponent put on a parade of his faulty processes.
To use a similar metaphor as above, this strategy attempts
to disqualify an opponent on the grounds that he does not
play by the rules.
Once
again, we need to take this strategy out of the realm of the
abstract by putting a familiar face on it. Debates about origins
and evolution sometimes begin with the perception that modern
creationism does not begin with science, but with an unfounded
faith faith which then tries to don the disguise of
science in order to retroactively justify its unproven assumptions
and falsely portray itself as scientific. The implication
is that the creationist side of the debate simply wants to
dress its views up in scientific clothing, even though that
is not how those beliefs originate. In plain terms, creationism
is dismissed on the charge that it is unscientific. In this
way, creationism is disqualified for unacceptable methodology.
After all, if creationism only turns to scientific language
after the fact to disguise that its true origins are an unproven
faith, then all of the evidence and argumentation is mere
window dressing rather than being discovered, constructed,
and established through the required scientific processes.
More
needs to be said concerning the charge that creationism is
disqualified because it results from unscientific processes.
Our format provides an advantage on this point as well. In
reviewing the evidence itself, we will be able to examine
whether or not creationism can be considered a valid theory
indicated by the evidence. If the creation model is potentially
falsifiable but remains a conclusion indicated by the observable
evidence, then it must be regarded as following the required
scientific processes. However, we will pick up that question
in a later section and, for the time being, return to our
present point.
This
brings us back again to the issue of equity. The desire to
dismiss an opposing point of view without having to examine
the evidence or arguments is not equitable. Trying to dismiss
and opposing view without an examination of the evidence is
like convicting someone without a trial. While it may be convenient
to justify such a premature dismissal on the grounds that
the opponent is “wrong anyway,” it’s just
not fair to dismiss a conclusion without an examination of
the evidence.
If
an opposing point of view has been already defeated, an examination
of the evidence will only serve to remind everyone of why
and how it was defeated. If an opposing point of view uses
invalid or unsound methodology, then the faulty nature of
those processes should be easy enough to expose during an
examination of the evidence and issues. Furthermore, such
an examination will also serve as an exhibition and vindication
of valid and sound methodology. But if a previous defeat is
difficult to demonstrate and if methods are not easily or
plainly shown to be faulty, then an opposing view should not
be dismissed on such grounds. If a previous defeat is difficult
to demonstrate and if methods are not easily or plainly shown
to be faulty, then prematurely dismissing an opposing view
on such grounds is not only without equity, it is unreasonable.
It dismisses conclusions without a sufficient demonstration
from the evidence.
Equity
will always allow an examination of the evidence. It will
always allow flaws and strengths in a point of view to be
brought to light by that examination. And it will never seek
to dismiss conclusions without demonstration through examination.
2.) Giving the Evidence a Chance to Speak
As
we stated early on in the introduction to this article series,
our intention is not to present new arguments. Instead, our
approach will be to define each theory and then to identify
the evidences along with the claims about that evidence made
by each side, in all cases using as brief of a description
as possible. And from there, our format will simply be first,
to keep track of where each point fits into the larger scope
of the debate and second, to keep track of the relative impact
that each point has on the status of the debate.
The
reason for this format is simple. We believe that clarity
on the question of origins, evolution, and creation is simply
a matter of two things.
A.)
First, identifying precisely what each theory (creation and
evolution) entails in its current, most prominent form.
B.)
And second, to let the evidence speak with the intention of
identifying to what extent the evidence does or does not point
toward or against one of those two theories.
Once
these two items are accomplished, we believe that clarity
will emerge and it will quite plain which one of these two
competing theories is far more reasonable (and scientific)
as an explanation of the known evidence.
The
fundamental intention of this article series is to let the
evidence speak and to keep that evidence from being obscured
by questions about where each piece fits in the overall framework
of the larger argument or obscured by exactly what each piece
does or does not demonstrate or indicate. That is why we emphasize
equity. A lack of equity in format or tactics, such as straw
men arguments or unfair early disqualifications, are attempts
to win a debate without letting the evidence speak.
3.) The Origin of Theories
In
science, all theories start with observation. This is a simple
fact as the quotes below establish.
“Science
– Science covers
the broad field of knowledge that deals with observed facts
and the relationships among those facts…Scientists
use systematic methods of study to make observations and collect
facts. They then work to develop theories that help them
order or unify related facts.” – Worldbook Encyclopedia,
Contributor: Joseph W. Dauben, Ph.D., Professor of History
and the History of Science, City
University of New York.
“Scientific
Method, term denoting the principles that guide scientific
research and experimentation, and also the philosophic bases
of those principles…Scientific method also involves
the interplay of inductive reasoning (reasoning from specific observations and
experiments to more general hypotheses and theories) and
deductive reasoning (reasoning from theories to account for
specific experimental results).” – "Scientific
Method," Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 99. © 1993-1998
Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
“Inductive
Method – Inductive
method is the reasoning process by which a person starts from
particular experiences and proceeds to generalizations…It
is the basis of the common sense upon which people act…Inductive
method is also used together with deduction to make scientific
discoveries. In deduction, people draw particular conclusions
by reasoning from general premises (see DEDUCTIVE METHOD).
To make discoveries,
scientists first obtain general theories by using induction.
From these general theories, they then deduce new, particular
predictions. These predictions are tested by observation and
experiment. The test results may be used in a new inductive
step to obtain a better general theory. Using
only deduction, people could not arrive at new theories.
Using only induction, people could not correct and improve
theories. By combining these methods, science is able to progress.”
– Worldbook Encyclopedia, Contributor: Morton L. Schagrin,
Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, State
University of New York, Fredonia.
“Empiricism
– a philosophical
approach that views experience as the most important source
of knowledge. It is the philosophical outlook of most scientists.
Empiricists try to answer as many questions as possible by
using information gathered by the senses.” –
Worldbook Encyclopedia, Contributor: W. W. Bartley, III, Ph.D.,
Former Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University.
“Scientific
theory – In attempting to explain things and events,
the scientist employs (1)
careful observation or experiments, (2) reports of regularities,
and (3) systematic explanatory schemes (theories). The statements of
regularities, if accurate, may be taken as empirical laws
expressing continuing relationships among
the things or characteristics observed. Thus, when empirical
laws are able to satisfy curiosity by uncovering an orderliness
in the behaviour of things or events, the
scientist may advance a systematic scheme, or scientific theory,
to provide an accepted explanation of why these laws obtain.”
– Britannica.com
“Science,
philosophy of, Elements of scientific enterprise –
From the beginning, scientists themselves have been interested
not merely in cataloging and describing the world of nature as they
find it but in making the workings of nature intelligible
with the help of compact and organized theories…Empirical
data and their theoretical interpretation – First are
the empirical elements. The task of science is to explain actual
events, processes, or phenomena in nature…those empirical
facts…On the one hand, the
facts in question may be discovered by using observational
methods…” – Britannica.com
In
fact, concerning the fact that theories start with observation,
Worldbook Encyclopedia makes the following comment and cites
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution as an example of
this trend.
“Science,
How scientists work – Scientists
use a number of methods in making discoveries and in developing
theories. These methods include (1) observing nature, (2)
classifying data, (3) using logic, (4) conducting experiments,
(5) forming a hypothesis
(proposed explanation), (6) expressing findings mathematically,
and (7) modeling with computers. Most scientific research involves some or all of these steps. Observing nature is one of the oldest scientific
methods…In the 1830's, Charles Darwin carefully observed
plants and animals in many parts of the world while serving
as a naturalist with a British scientific expedition aboard
the H.M.S. Beagle. Study of the specimens collected on the
voyage helped Darwin
develop his theory that modern species had evolved from a
few earlier ones…Forming a hypothesis requires talent,
skill, and creativity. Scientists
base their proposed explanations on existing information.
They strive to form hypotheses that help explain, order, or unify related
facts.” – Worldbook Encyclopedia, Contributor:
Joseph W. Dauben, Ph.D., Professor of History and the History
of Science, City University
of New York.
The
fact that the observation of empirical data serves as the
basis for theorization is an important point. In order to
maintain clarity, we must be able to distinguish the observations,
the empirical data or evidence, from the theory that attempts
to explain them. We will discuss the practical applications
of this process more a little later on, but for now this leads
right into our next point.
4.) Evidence and Interpretation
An
indispensable element that often goes overlooked in debates
is the ability to discern between evidence and a particular
interpretation of that evidence, between the observed data
and the various theories explaining that data. Often times,
particularly in debates on topics such as origins, evolution,
and creation, we’ve heard a particular interpretation
so many times that we confuse the interpretation for the evidence
itself. But, in order to achieve clarity and in order to allow
the evidence to speak, we must be able to identify and maintain
the distinction between what is evidence and what is interpretation.
In
the segment above entitled “The Origin of Theories,” we discussed how all scientific theories
begin with the observation of empirical data. And when it
comes to debates about origins, one central fact that is often
misunderstood is that both views are looking at and utilizing
the same evidence. It is simply not the case that evolutionists
and atheists are looking at one set of empirical data while
creationists are looking at an entirely different set of empirical
data. The empirical data doesn’t change. To change it,
you’d have to change the entire world, or rather the
entire universe, around us. Consequently, it’s only
the interpretation of that data that differs. And that is
why it is so important to let the data, the empirical evidence,
speak.
One
of the main premises of this article is that if we can distinguish
between what is empirical fact and what is an interpretation
of that fact, clarity will emerge with ease. This essential
issue will be a recurring theme of this study. Our next segment
will continue to explore the implications of this distinction.
5.) Identifying Direction
In
the section above entitled, “Giving the Evidence a Chance to Speak,” we stated that we
believe clarity is a matter of two things. The first was identifying
exactly what each theory entails. And the second was identifying
to what extent the evidence does or does not point toward
or against one of those theories.
Identifying
direction goes right along with distinguishing between evidence
and interpretation. So, what is “identifying direction”
and how does it relate to distinguishing between evidence
and interpretation?
All
evidence tells us something. Individual pieces of evidence
both suggest certain interpretations as well as rule out other
interpretations. But most importantly, individual pieces of
evidence don’t necessarily point to just one single
interpretation. In fact individual pieces of evidence seldom
point to one and only one explanation. Typically, there is
more than one way to explain the same piece of evidence and
often a single piece of evidence can suggest more than one
reasonable explanation. In order to achieve clarity it is
essential not only to distinguish between evidence and interpretation,
but also to determine whether a particular piece of evidence
points to only one interpretation or whether that piece of
evidence equally suggests a number of explanations.
Furthermore,
there are three potential directions that evidence can point.
First,
evidence can point toward a particular interpretation. This
does not mean that every piece of evidence, which points toward
a particular interpretation, directly undermines the opposing
views. Sometimes evidence pointing toward one interpretation
only helps its own overall standing, but doesn’t necessarily
hurt (or bear at all) on the opposing views. In the long run,
the interpretation which should be accepted is the one that
is shown to be favored by the most evidence. Second, evidence
can point against a particular interpretation. And it can
do so without necessarily providing direct support for the
opposing interpretation, except perhaps by working to eliminate
the competition. And third, as stated above, particular pieces
of evidence might not point either direction more than the
other. Maintaining clarity in a debate requires the ability
to know which of these directions each individual component
of the evidence is pointing. During the portion of this study
where we review the evidence, we will rely heavily on making
these kinds of identifications.
As
stated previously, the strategy of this study is twofold.
Our first strategy is to properly place each piece of evidence
and interpretation within the larger framework of the whole
debate. Our second strategy is to keep track of the relative
impact each point has on the status of that debate. Identifying
which direction particular evidence is pointing is a crucial
element to keeping track of the status of the debate.
Once
the direction of each piece of evidence is determined, all
of the evidence viewed together should give us the whole picture
and favor one interpretation with clarity.
6.) Proof by Presupposition and Characterization
When
it comes to determining which direction the evidence is pointing,
there is one major challenge that’s worthy of mention:
presupposition. Presupposition is like a set of glasses that
makes it appear as though the evidence is pointing more heavily
in favor of one theory, when in reality the evidence on its
own does not.
Let’s
talk briefly about presuppositions. Perhaps the two most problematic
ways that presuppositions interfere with clarity is either
when presuppositions are themselves confused with evidence
or when presuppositions are not properly identified as being
a sub-point of one of the overall competing interpretations.
Of course these two ways are closely related. And they typically
manifest as attempts to disprove an opposing view by citing
other elements from one’s own interpretation. But the
fact of the matter is that you simply cannot disprove an opponent’s
interpretation by citing parts of your own interpretation
as though they were already proven. Neither can you prove
an interpretation merely by citing one of the sub-points of
that interpretation as though it were already proven. An opposing
interpretation can only be disproved by citing specific evidence,
which contradicts it. And each interpretation can only be
proved by citing specific evidence, which supports it.
To
expound a little further, there are only 3 ways to disprove
any given interpretation. First, either a single, decisive
piece of evidence or, perhaps more usually, a combination
of evidences can be shown to be incompatible with a particular
interpretation. Second, if more evidence is shown to rationally
lean toward an alternative explanation, then an interpretation
is generally considered to be defeated. Or third, a particular
interpretation can be disproved if it is shown to be irreparably
self-contradicting in its various components. But an interpretation
simply cannot be disproved by citing a portion of the opposing
interpretation.
Before
moving on, it is also important to make note of another issue
that is closely related to “Evidence and Interpretation.” In debates, not only can interpretations
and presuppositions or sub-points of an overall theory be
confused with actual evidence, but also the language, adjectives,
and adverbs used by a particular side to describe or characterize
the evidence can become synonymous with the evidence itself.
Distinguishing between evidence and the presuppositions of
one interpretation also requires the ability to distinguish
between the stark characteristics of the evidence itself and
the characterizations that a particular side would like to
ascribe to that evidence.
A
few, practical examples from the origins debate may serve
to further illuminate this concept, but for the sake of expediency,
we will cover those in a later section. For now we will cover
our seventh and final point.
7.) Identifying and Assessing Explanatory Amendments
Finally,
it is also important to mention that theories often require
modification in light of subsequent experimentation and additional
data gathered after the initial theory is described. These
additions or changes to a theory might be described as additional
explanatory amendments. They are additional because they add
mechanisms or elements to a theory. They are amendments because
these mechanisms or elements were not part of the original
understanding of the theory. They are explanatory because
the function of these mechanisms and elements is to explain
how the theory can accommodate potentially unsupportive or
harmful evidence.
Given
this function, amendments to a theory rarely provide such
a good explanation of the evidence that they help to actually
prove a theory. While it is possible for an amendment to “just
click” and make a great deal of sense out of additional
pieces of evidence, it is typically more appropriate to think
of explanatory amendments as either keeping a theory level
on the scales rather than giving it additional supportive
weight. Subsequently,
having to add an explanatory amendment to a theory can’t
really help to disprove the opposing view. Explanatory amendments
are about a theory’s own internal maintenance and not
external criticism of an alternative view. They merely bolster
the theory to which they are added.
Not
all explanatory amendments are equal. Some fit more naturally
to the original theory and others are more extraneous, unrelated,
and forced. Some are more logical, plausible, or observationally
based. Others are more contrived. Some are speculative, which
isn’t entirely problematic, but explanatory amendments
can be assessed and compared with regard to which ones are
more, less, or perhaps equally speculative. And simply put,
the less speculative, the better the explanation.
It
should be stated that the need for an explanatory amendment
does not necessarily mean that the theory is disproved. That
depends on to what extent the explanatory amendments to a
theory are either artificial and extraneous to the evidence
and the original theory or are somehow able to aptly compliment
and dovetail with the original theory and make even more sense
of the evidence. But ultimately, any theory that is in need
of a great deal of explanatory amendments in order for it
to accommodate evidence, particularly if those amendments
are highly contrived and add increased improbability, the
more the explanatory amendments themselves serve as indicators
that a theory has failed and is incompatible with the evidence.
And, in the end, the theory with either less amendments or
with the least extraneous amendments is shown to be the better
explanation.
Just
what explanatory amendments are and how they function in both
theories and debates will become clearer through the examples
presented in the rest of this study. For now, it is simply
important to make note of the necessity to both identify and
assess the relative value and effects of explanatory amendments.
In particular, we should weigh the relative probability and
extraneousness of additional explanatory amendments. This
is essential for maintaining clarity in communication, examination,
and debate.
Exemplifying Clarity
In
order to better depict how the 7 essential elements for clarity
function, let’s consider an illustration. The point
here is not to be exhaustive since we’re only attempting
to provide a depiction of some basic concepts. Furthermore,
it should be noted that the different theories in scenario
below are not intended to represent or correspond to either
side in the debate between evolution and creationism. With
that said, let’s consider the following illustration.
Suppose
that 2 hikers were out for a walk one day and they stumbled
across a beach covered with rocks. They quickly noticed that
a large patch of those rocks were colored with a very bright,
single color of paint in the form of a large, unbroken area.
Now let’s see how a few of our essential elements for
clarity would apply.
First,
we might consider the application of “The Origin of Theories.”
In
our segment on how theories originate, we established that
scientific theories arise as attempts to explain and understand
observed phenomena. In our example, we might imagine how after
noticing the painted rocks, the two hikers might use their
initial observations about the rocks to suggest possible explanations
for how they came to be painted. The first hiker might suggest
the possibility that someone hand-painted the rocks. The second
hiker might suggest that the paint was instead spilled or
dumped onto the beach. Then maybe one of the hikers would
joke about the paint forming naturally on the rocks or the
paint arriving on drops of rain the night before.
This
exemplifies 2 things concerning how evidence relates to the
origin of theories. First, this exemplifies how evidence can
point toward some explanations, such as the “hand-painted”
or “spillage” theories, while at the same time
ruling out others explanations, such as the “rain”
or “natural formation” theories. And second, this
exemplifies how particular aspects of the evidence can suggest
more than one, equally logical explanation. In this case,
the considerations that the rocks were painted and in a single,
unbroken patch suggests and fits equally well with either
a hand-painted or spillage theory.
Second,
we might consider the application of “Evidence and Interpretation.”
In
our segment on maintaining the distinction between evidence
and interpretation, we mentioned 2 important items. First,
we mentioned how often times in debates, we’ve heard
a particular interpretation so many times that we confuse
the interpretation for the evidence itself. And second, we
mentioned that this can give rise to the impression either
that both sides are looking at different sets of evidence
or that one side is ignoring some portion of the evidence
altogether.
In
our example, we might imagine that the 2 hikers have a really
long discussion and eventually they are overheard by others.
After a short time a crowd gathers. Now, for the sake of this
point, let’s imagine for a moment that perhaps only
the tops of the rocks were painted, not the bottoms. We might
also imagine that as the 2 hikers continue to discuss the
evidence, the second hiker repeatedly refers to the fact that
only the tops are painted and whenever he does so, he uses
phrases like, “Yes, but the paint was spilled only on
the tops.” In fact, whenever the second hiker refers
to the fact that only the tops of the rocks are painted, he
always couples this with the word “spilled.” Whether
deliberate or unintentional, the constant coupling of the
term “spilled” with “tops of rocks only”
might produce 2 impressions in the minds of both the nearby
audience as well as perhaps in the mind of the second hiker
himself.
First,
it might create the effective impression that spillage is
inherently required or implied by fact that the paint is only
on the top portions of the rocks. This is an example of confusing
the interpretation with the evidence. The fact that there
is paint only on the tops of the rocks is evidence. The idea
that the paint is only on the tops because it was spilled
there is an interpretation of that evidence. But, in reality,
the fact that only the tops of the rocks are painted is not
at all incompatible with the hand-painted theory. Someone
painting the rocks by hand might very well have only painted
the top portions. There is nothing about hand-painting the
rocks, which requires the full surface of the rock to be painted.
And
second, it might create the effective impression that the
first hiker is not considering or is perhaps ignoring the
fact that only the tops of the rocks have paint. This is an
example of how the impression can often arise in debates that
both sides are looking at different parts of the evidence
or one side is ignoring some of the evidence.
Third,
we might consider the application of “Identifying Direction.”
In
our segment about identifying direction, we stated the importance
of determining whether a particular piece of evidence points
in favor of one theory, points against another theory, or
doesn’t particularly help or hurt either theory more
than the other. Our previous scenario in which only the tops
of the rocks were painted already illustrated this issue.
As we stated, if only the tops of the rocks were painted,
that would be consistent with paint being spilled but it is
also consistent with someone coming along and painting just
the tops of the rocks with a brush. This is an example of
how one aspect of the evidence might not particularly favor
or hurt either of the possible explanations.
But
let’s examine a few other examples. Suppose that all
of the painted rocks had visible brush strokes on them. This
would be an example of evidence that very strongly favors
the hand-painted theory. Brush strokes are uniquely suggestive
of hand-painting by brush. In contrast, brush strokes are
entirely incompatible with a spillage theory. This exemplifies
how some evidence can either point in favor of one theory
or point against another theory. However, not all evidence
that supports one theory necessarily hurts the other as drastically
as this example of the brush strokes.
For
example, let’s imagine that there were no brush strokes
or that the brush strokes had not been noticed yet. Instead,
we might consider the implications of splash marks. The absence
of splash marks wouldn’t necessarily disprove the spillage
theory, although it might present an element that is contrary
to what we would expect to find if the spillage theory were
correct. On the other hand, the presence of splash marks,
while it certainly seems more consistent with the spillage
theory wouldn’t necessarily disprove or hurt the hand-painted
theory either, given the possibility that the painter may
have been clumsy and at times spilled a little paint out of
his bucket. The issue of splash marks is an example of how
some evidence can help or hurt one explanation without necessarily
helping or hurting the competing theory.
Fourth,
we might consider the application of “Proof by Presupposition and Characterization.”
In
our segment about presuppositions, we remarked about attempts
to disprove an opposing view by citing other sub-components
from one’s own overall interpretation. Using our illustration,
we might imagine the second hiker attempted to reject the
hand-painted theory on the grounds that the painted rocks
serve no purpose and are therefore unintentional. Should such
an argument disprove the hand-painted theory?
Not
really. The unintentional nature of the painted rocks is not
a fact or a piece of evidence. It is actually a sub-point
of the larger spillage theory. The painting of the rocks is
only unintentional if the paint was in fact spilled. In short,
the unintentional nature of the paint is only true if the
larger spillage theory is itself true. Consequently, the second
hiker is simply attempting to disprove the hand-painted explanation
by citing a sub-point of his own theory as though it were
part of the factual evidence. As we stated earlier, a theory
can only be disproved by the evidence itself. You cannot disprove
an opposing view by assuming that a sub-point of your own
interpretation is as much of a fact as the evidence itself.
This is an example of proof by presupposition.
However,
this is also an example of how one side’s characterization
of the evidence can become confused with the actual, stark
characteristics of the evidence itself. Everyone might well
agree that painting rocks on a beach is somewhat whimsical
and probably doesn’t serve any relatively functional
purpose. Some nuances of the definition for “whimsical”
overlap nuances of the word “purposeless,” in
the shared sense of being “playful.” And some
nuances of the word “purposeless” overlap nuances
of the word “unintentional,” in the shared sense
of being “accidental.” But just because everyone
might agree that painting rocks is whimsical at best doesn’t
mean that it’s fair to say that everyone agrees the
rocks received paint unintentionally or accidentally. Of course,
this involves the logical fallacy of equivocation, in which
the middle term of “purposeless” equates to “whimsical”
initially but then switches to signify “accidental”
or “unintentional.” And this exemplifies what
it means to confuse the stark characteristic of the evidence
with one side’s preferred theoretical characterization.
Fifth,
and finally, we might consider the application of “Identifying
and Assessing Explanatory Amendments.”
In
our segment about explanatory amendments, we stated that initial
theories are sometimes later amended with additional explanatory
mechanisms or elements, which were not present originally.
We also stated that the function of these additional mechanisms
or elements is to enable the theory to accommodate evidence
that might otherwise be problematic.
To
illustrate this point, suppose we set aside the previous scenarios
involving brush strokes or splash marks. Instead, we might
suppose that the rocks were not only painted on the top but
instead some of the rocks were painted on the top while others
were painted on the bottom and still others were painted on
one of the sides. Furthermore, rocks with paint on one portion
were completely interspersed with rocks where the paint was
on another portion. Like the brush strokes, such a factor
would strongly favor the hand-painted theory because it indicates
that the rocks were treated individually. Conversely, if the
paint had been spilled on the rocks, the paint would fall
from one general direction, and consequently, should always
be on the top surface. If the paint is only on one side of
each rock but not solely on the top side, then this information
would tend to rule out the theory of a simple paint spill.
However,
the second hiker might attempt to maintain his spillage theory
by adding another explanatory mechanism to bolster his case.
On this note, the second hiker might suggest that after the
initial spill someone came along and shuffled the rocks around,
so that as the rocks rolled into new positions, what was originally
the top of each rock was now facing in all different directions.
This would allow the second hiker’s theory to continue
and it also provides an opportunity to further discuss explanatory
amendments.
Earlier
when considering the implications of splash marks on the nearby
rocks at the edge of the painted patch, we stated that such
splash marks are not ideally consistent with the hand-painted
theory but that they could be explained if the painter had
a bucket and was at times clumsy with the paint. This also
constitutes a sort of explanatory amendment to the original
hand-painted theory.
More
specifically, the shuffling of the rocks equates to an additional
mechanism while the bucket equates to an additional element.
And contrasting the two gives us a chance to illustrate how
even explanatory amendments can be assessed and compared.
As we stated earlier on, not all explanatory amendments are
equal. In this example, the idea that the painter would have
a bucket is far less extraneous to the hand-painted theory
than the idea of someone shuffling the painted rocks is to
the spillage theory. The spillage theory does not necessitate
a shuffling of the rocks in the same way that the hand-painted
theory infers a container for holding the paint, such as a
bucket. The bucket is more or less integrally related to the
existing components of the hand-painted theory: the painter
and the deliberate transportation of paint to the site. But
the shuffling of the rocks would require a lot more work and
it is work which has nothing to do with the initial theory.
So, while the shuffling amendment would allow the spillage
theory to continue just as clumsy spills from a bucket would
allow the hand-painted theory to continue, the 2 amendments
can themselves be analyzed and even compared. And, in the
end, the theory with either less amendments or with the least
extraneous amendments is shown to be the better explanation.
We
have now finished our illustrative examples. As we move ahead,
here is the complete list of essential elements for clarity
one last time.
1.) Equity: If Not a Fresh Start, At Least a
Fair Start
2.) Giving the Evidence a Chance to Speak
3.) The Origin of Theories
4.) Evidence and Interpretation
5.) Identifying Direction
6.) Proof by Presupposition and Characterization
7.) Identifying and Assessing Explanatory Amendments
These
are the issues that we will be looking for and keeping track
of as we explore the evidence in the debate over origins,
evolution, and creationism. Our belief is that with these
items properly identified and processed, that clarity will
be the inevitable result and which theory is the more rational
explanation of the evidence will emerge quite plainly. This
concludes the introductory portion of this article. We will
now move on to our next section, "Pulling It All Together"
in order to discuss how some of these essential elements for
clarity apply, not to an illustration, but to some actual
preliminary issues in the debate about origins.