As we begin this section, we’ll start with the basics. Who was Philo? And why is he relevant to this topic?

Philo – Philo or Philo Judaeus [Lat.,=Philo the Jew], c.20 BC-c.AD 50, Alexandrian Jewish philosopher…Philo was the first important thinker to attempt to reconcile biblical religion with Greek philosophy. In so doing he developed an allegorical interpretation of Scripture that enabled him to find many of the doctrines of Greek philosophy in the Torah (the Pentateuch). – Columbia Encyclopedia

As we can see from the quote above, Philo was a Jewish writer from the first century AD. His writing is considered to reflect a reconciliation between the religion of the Hebrew bible and Greek philosophy. As also noted above, such a task required Philo to discard a literal interpretation of Hebrew scriptures and replace it with allegorizing, which essentially means taking straightforward historical narratives and turning them into abstract concepts. This process, by its very nature, requires some divergence from Jewish views derived from more literal methods of interpreting the Hebrew bible.

And it is on this note that we will discuss the frequent references in Philo’s writing concerning a divine figure that he refers to as the Logos. Here additional questions arise. To what extent does Philo’s concept of the Logos faithfully reflect older, pre-Hellenistic trends in Judaism? And to what extent does Philo’s concept of the Logos deviate from original or authentic Judaism to perhaps align with Greek philosophical ideas?

The most obvious application of these questions, of course, concerns potential similarities between Philo and Christianity. Although this inquiry will be primarily concerned with the relationship between Philo and other existing or more ancient forms of Judaism, we will start with some brief notes on this initial question.

Logos – The influence of Philo on the author of the fourth gospel, hitherto accepted by many scholars, has been questioned lately. If there are similarities between Philo and John, there are also many differences. Philo never thought of identifying the Logos with the messiah as John did. Moreover John clearly defines the relation of the Logos to God as the second person of the Trinity, distinct though eternally inseparable from the Father. In John's gospel the concept of Logos is more dynamic than in Philo. Christ as the Logos is the complete Revelation of God. Finally the main difference between Philo and John remains the idea of the incarnation of the Logos, in order that mankind might see his Glory. – Illustrated Dictionary & Concordance of the Bible, edited by Geoffrey Wigoder, G.G. The Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd., http://www.answers.com/topic/logos

Logos – Philo of Alexandria, a 1st-century-ad Jewish philosopher, taught that the logos was the intermediary between God and the cosmos, being both the agent of creation and the agent through which the human mind can apprehend and comprehend God. According to Philo and the Middle Platonists, philosophers who interpreted in religious terms the teachings of the 4th-century-bc Greek master philosopher Plato, the logos was both immanent in the world and at the same time the transcendent divine mind. – Encyclopedia Britannica

Logos – The Stoics (see Stoicism) were influenced in part by Platonism and Aristotelianism in their conception of the Logos. To them God was immanent in the world, its vitalizing force, and God as the law guiding the universe they called Logos; with the additional idea that all things develop from this force, it is called the Spermaticos Logos. The Logos reappears in Greek philosophy in a much restricted form in the system of emanations of Neoplatonism. Certain books of the Old Testament present a principle called the Wisdom of God active in the world. At the same time there was a very ancient Hebrew idea of the Word of God, also active in the world. Thus the Wisdom and the Word of God, sometimes quasi-distinct from Him, coalesced. Philo, in his synthesis of Judaism and Greek thought, naturally hit upon the Logos as a union between the systems; hence his Logos retains qualities both of the Stoic Logos and the Hebrew Word of God. Philo's God is remote, unaffected by the world, without attributes, unmoving; hence He must have mediation to connect Him with the world. At times Philo's Logos is independent of God (because of God's remoteness); at other times the Logos is simply the Reason of God (because Philo's monism obliges God to act in the world through His mediating forces). St. John in his Gospel adapted the term to his purpose. In the prologue of 14 verses the idea of the Gospel is stated clearly and simply. The Logos, which is the eternal God, took flesh and became man, in time. The Logos is Jesus. The impersonal, remote God of Philo is not there; the intermediate Logos, neither God nor man, has been replaced by a Logos that is both God and man. This explanation of the relation of God and man became an abiding feature of Christian thought. – Columbia Encyclopedia

(In the quote below, Segal compares Philo to second-century Christian writer Justin Martyr.)

Since Justin understands the appearance of God in Jacob’s dreams, wrestlings and even at the burning bush as a single consistent figure, he is able to promote both the independent personality of the being manifested and his divine nature. Like Philo Justin calls the logos another God (heteros theos), distinct in number, if not in essence. (ch. 56). The sharply drawn personality of this manifestation (together with the doctrine of the incarnation) is the element which most distinguished Justin’s concept of logos from Philo’s. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 223

As indicated in the quotes above, both Philo and early Christians used the title Logos in application to a divine hypostasis. However, like comparisons between Greek philosophy and Jewish Complex Monotheism, here again we find that the terms are similar but the way each group defined those terms is significantly different. In particular, striking differences existed concerning the most essential aspects of the Logos, including the exact relationship between the Logos and the Supreme Being and the concept of the Logos itself/himself. Concerning differences in the concept of the Logos, Philo never identified the Logos with the Jewish Messiah. John did. Likewise, John always viewed the Logos as a personal figure who had at times visited the patriarchs of Israel. Like his Greek predecessors, Philo often (though not always) conceived of the Logos in impersonal terms such as “the law guiding the universe.” And for Philo, to the extent that the Logos was a distinct person, it was not God but a being between God and man. For John, the Logos was God and existed within (as part of) the Godhead. (For an example of Philo and John drawing from similar Jewish traditions see John 1 where John, like Philo, describes the involvement of the Logos or Word in creation. Philo’s position on the topic of creation can be seen in the next quote below.)

With regard to the relationship between God and the Logos, Philo seems to exhibit some degree of self-contradiction. As stated in the last quote above, at times Philo seems to conceptualize the Logos as part of the Supreme Being, including, at times a personalized manifestation by which the Supreme Being relates to mankind. At other times, the Logos is a separate being from the Supreme God, a creation that did not always exist, and God’s first deputy in ruling over the affairs of the world.

Contradiction on this point is also described by Segal. In the quote below Segal attests that at times Philo identified the Logos with the Supreme Being so strongly that he could claim God had no help from lesser beings in creation despite also identifying the Logos as God’s agent in the act of creating.

Philo could even use the phrase “second God” to describe the logos without thinking that he had violated the monotheistic basis of his religion…even Philo, who was not adverse to the designation “second God” and who describes the logos as God’s agent manifestation in creation, denies that God had help from assistants in creating. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 182-183

Yet elsewhere, Segal describes how Philo also refers to the Logos in terms of a “divine helper” in creation and also as a “separate divine hypostasis.” Philo identified this “divine helper” in creation as the Logos, the Greek equivalent of the Aramaic term Memra and the English term “Word.” We should note Segal’s statement that Philo identifies the Logos/Word with the divine name. This is evident in Segal’s explanation that the usage of “Lord” (or “LORD”) in English translations of the Hebrew Bible is equivalent to the tetragrammaton (the four letters of the divine name YHWH.) Notice also that Segal attributes Philo’s views to an attempt to understand biblical texts like Genesis 19:24, which refer to a person called YHWH who is on earth and another person simultaneously identified as YHWH who is in heaven.

In this case, the helper is called Adam, but the concept of a divine helper is not unlike the idea that Wisdom or the logos was God’s agent in creation. In fact, Philo sometimes claims that the logos is identical to the primal man, on the basis of Gen. 1:26. 14 [Footnote 14: See Conf. 146 and Leg. All. i 43.] – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 114

When “place” refers to something divine revealed to man, as it did in the passage above, for Philo, it may mean God’s image, His logos. It is, in fact, impossible for a man to see God and live (Ex. 33:20). However, Moses and the elders see the image of God or everything “that is behind me” (Ex. 33:23). These are equivalent to the logos which as a second God can also be given the title “Lord.” (kyrios – YHWH). This doctrine, which allows that “place” is a divine creature called Lord, cannot strike us as innocent, especially when we know that “Lord” is synonymous with the tetragrammaton and when the structure of the argument resembles the heretical argument which R. Ishmael b. Yosi encountered at Gen. 19:24 which derived as second power in heaven, (who was the agent of God in the destruction of Sodom) from the second appearance of the divine name YHWH. By a similar method, Philo derives the idea that the logos is a separate, second divine hypostasis from the fact that “God” is repeated in “place of God” instead of using the pronoun (i.e., My place) as one would normally expect. Because of this, the logos is properly a god and may be called by the divine names. Philo is using an argument which R. Ishmael found dangerous. Furthermore he has paralleled the structure of the argument in the Mekhilta. The reasoning by which the name of God and the logos become equated is also familiar to us. In this same passage in On Dreams, Philo states: Here it gives us the title of “God” to His chief Word, not from any superstitious nicety in applying names, but with one aim before him, to use words to express facts. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 162-163

Philo can use the same argument and the same term “second God” (Greek: deuteros theos, Latin: secundus dues) whenever the biblical text might imply the existence of a second deity, not just when the term “place” is present: (Gen. IX:6) Why does (Scripture) say, as if (speaking) of another God, “In the image of God He made man” and not “in His own image”? Most excellently and veraciously this oracle was given by God. For nothing mortal can be made in the likeness of the Most High One and father of the universe but (only) in that of the second God, who is His logos…Here Philo make no disclaimer about the metaphoric quality of the terms he is using. He unabashedly calls the logos a “second God.” Thus, in calling attention to various similar scriptural passages, the rabbis were not just stylizing theoretical arguments. Real traditions of a “second God” were present in Judaism as early as the time of Philo. (Footnote 14: Italics added, Quest. In Gen. ii¸ 62 Philo Suppliment I, p. 150, tr. R. Marcus. Eusebius (P.E. VII, 13, 1) credits Philo with the term “second God,” denoting the logos. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 163-164

Elsewhere Philo refers to other texts which were seen by the rabbis to be dangerous because they could imply a plurality of deities: Gen 11:7 (“Come let us go down to confuse their language”), Gen. 3:22 (Behold Adam has become as one of us”), and Gen. 1:26 are mentioned. Philo maintains that one of God’s two powers descends – in one case, to create man; in another, to punish those building the tower. He explains that these powers are angels and that their presence has so impressed some people (even Moses) that they feel no shame in calling them gods. In other words, Philo depends on his concept of the powers of justice and mercy to explain scriptural plurals, calling them both angels and divine. Therefore in On the Change of Names, Philo can offer another interpretation of what the patriarch saw when scripture says they saw God. (6-7). First, he remarks that they saw the same creative power of God which Moses saw on Sinai for the first time, having already been privileged to see God’s ruling power. We remember that he has previously said that the elders saw the image of God or the logos….Since Moses has already known the lesser of God’s powers, seeing the higher power as well can be equivalent to seeing the logos, the sum of all the powers. Again we note the same exegesis as the Mekhilta records in rabbinic lore a century later. This time Philo provides a witness to the doctrine which the rabbis defend, instead of one they condemn. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 176-177

Similarly, Segal describes Philo’s view of the Logos as a “copy” of God, not “the original.”

Though Philo maintains no human characterization is properly applied to God, he also says that the logos may be called God, since it is in the form of the logos that God has chosen to reveal himself. Philo also seems to imply that certain men are actually able to see God directly, if they can transcend materiality. Conversely, he knows of men who know only the logos, who “take the image to be not a copy, but that original form itself.” It takes but a small leap of the imagination, based on Philo’s discussion…to suspect that there were others in Philo’s day who spoke of a “second god,” but who were not as careful as Philo in defining the limits of the term. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 163

And lastly, Segal includes Philo in a category that depicted a man-like figure acting as judge “next to God,” an idea that later rabbis viewed as violating monotheism.

By the end of the second century, at least two different kinds of heretics were opposed in rabbinic polemic. The earliest polemic was designed to counter apocalyptic, mystical or Christian identification of a manlike figure enthroned as judge next to God, as described in various epiphany texts. The second to emerge involved the claim that the creator was ignorant of a higher god and that there as a complete separation of divine mercy from divine justice, even to the extent of making them properties of two different gods. The first tradition could be seen as early as Philo in Hellenistic Judaism and was continuously employed by mystics, apocalyptists and Christians. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 244

The following quotes from Segal summarize this type of general contradiction in Philo’s concept of the Logos, which Segal attributes to Philo’s lack of a systematic approach to the topic.

For instance Philo stresses that there is no God besides God the Most High and uses Dt. 4:39, as the rabbis do, to deny that any other figure can be considered God…In this particular case, Philo denies that any other being can be God’s agent, for there is only one God. It is interesting that Philo picks the context of the story of Melchizedek to discuss this issue, since elsewhere he allows that the logos can be considered as a “second God” and divine mediator. It appears as though Philo is opposed to some concepts of mediation, even while he maintains the agency of the logos. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 166-167

Thus God can actually appear to men as a man or angel. Any Jew or gentile would be able to call God’s angels divine, or a “second God,” as Philo himself does, while only the most trained would be able to see that this title does not compromise monotheism. The remark about a “second God” was occasioned by the angelic theophany which Jacob witnessed. The existence of the second figure is necessary exegetically, because the angel which appeared to Jacob was both shaped like a man and called a god. Of course, the story is important to Philo not only for discussing anthropomorphism, but also because Philo is interested in characterizing the type of vision vouchsafed to the mystic seeker of God, here symbolized by the patriarch Jacob-Israel. Philo takes the story to mean that the mystic can see a figure of God which is a “second God,” but that figure does not compromise monotheism. The identity of the second figure is especially interesting. Philo’s exegesis relies on the Septuagint translation of “place of God” for the place-name of Beth-El (lit. house of God). For Philo, “place” is an important concept which may have three different meanings. The first definition corresponds to a physical space filled with a material form, our normal understanding of the term. The second corresponds to the logos, the hypostasized intelligence of God, and the third corresponds to God himself. Although he defines the terms philosophically, Philo’s terminology bears striking resemblance to the early rabbinic designation MQWM for God. His concept of logos is similar to the rabbinic doctrine of God’s Shekhinah, each of which is often used to explain the same difficult scriptures. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 161-162

Of course Philo develops all of his arguments in an exegetical framework, not a systematic one, as Wolfson implies. Alternatively Philo can discuss the logos as the sum of the forms, which can be manifested by the visible form of an angel. Philo, therefore, can risk contradiction by assuming that YHWH is Lord of Powers or the logos…Alternatively, YHWH can be allegorized as the just, governing power even though that might contradict the exegesis elsewhere that the tetragrammaton signifies the logos or all the powers. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 174-175

Throughout the quotes provided in this section, we will continue to see examples in which Philo’s writings exhibit contradicting ideas about the Logos, at times identifying the Logos as a subordinate creation and God’s deputy while at other times identifying the Logos as a manifest hypostasis of the Supreme Being Himself.

Having reviewed the comments in the quotes above, there are a few summary points worth noting here before we move on.

First, we should not let Philo’s Hellenistic influence confuse the issue here. It is true that by the fourth century BC, Greek philosophical thought included the idea of a divine emanation identified as the Logos. However, as we have seen, Jewish traditions regarding the angel of YHWH as a divine hypostasis (that was YHWH and yet was distinct from YHWH) predate both Philo and the presence of Logos traditions in Hellenistic philosophy. These Jewish traditions are presented in the Hebrew Bible itself beginning in the patriarchal period over 1,000 to 1,500 years before the emergence of the Logos emanation in Greek thought. And the Jewish belief in multiple, hypostatic persons of YHWH is derived from a consideration of passages within the Hebrew scriptures. Therefore, although Philo’s regard for Greek philosophy caused his conception of the Logos to have a uniquely Hellenistic flavor, the presence of the Logos does not indicate a Greek origin for that concept. Instead, Philo’s writings only affirm the widespread nature of the Jewish belief in the Word of God as a hypostatic person who was both God and somehow distinct from God.

Second, as we saw early on in this section, Philo was attempting to reconcile Hebrew religion with Greek philosophy. In light of that fact along with these contradictions, there is no need to trace all of Philo’s descriptions of the Logos to Greek philosophy. When Philo’s concept of the Logos is a separate being between God and the world or a mere impersonal abstraction, Philo mirrors the concepts of Plato and the Greek philosophers. When Philo insists that there is only one God and describes the Logos as part of the Supreme Being, as a personalized manifestation of the Supreme Being purposed to relate to mankind, he mirrors Complex Monotheism from the Hebrew bible.

Third, it is in regard to his reflection of Complex Monotheism that we are most concerned with Philo. In reflecting Complex Monotheism, Philo’s writing actually further attests to the widespread nature of Complex Monotheism within various sects of pre-rabbinic Judaism. This will be the primary focus of much of the rest of this section.

But before we examine how Philo demonstrates larger Complex Monotheistic trends within pre-rabbinic Judaism, it is important to point out Segal’s agreement concerning the Hebrew origins of Philo’s ideas. Segal informs us that Philo’s work was characterized by “careful exegesis.” While this does not mean that Philo’s interpretations are reasonable or accurate in all ways, it does affirm that at least some of Philo’s ideas about God and the Logos were derived from study of the Hebrew bible, even while other aspects were borrowed from the Greeks.

Of course Philo develops all of his arguments in an exegetical framework, not a systematic one, as Wolfson implies. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 174-175

The traditional explanation that Philo did not know Hebrew, and hence confused the midrashic tradition, does injustice to the careful exegesis we know was characteristic of him. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 180

Throughout the rest of this section, various quotes will continue to provide examples in which Philo cites specific Hebrew texts as the source of his conclusions. At least one partial (albeit more superficial) example of how Hebrew texts drove some of Philo’s ideas involves Philo’s use of divine titles.

16. Although Philo spoke of the logos more than fourteen hundred times in his writings, there are a few examples that are especially important. To quote New Testament scholar Larry Hurtado: Philo calls the Logos “the second god” (ton deuteron theon) and states that the “God” in whose image Adam was created in Gen 1:27 is actually the Logos, which the rational part of the soul resembles. It is impossible (according to Philo) to think of anything earthly being a direct image of God himself…[and] Philo also calls the Logos “mediator” (mesites). 34 – Brown, Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus, Volume 2, Theological Objections, p. 22

17. Philo also refers to the logos as “firstborn” (protogonon), “archangel,” “Name of God,” and “governor and administrator of all things,” stating that the “divine Word” (theios logos) is the “chief” of God’s powers. 35 – Brown, Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus, Volume 2, Theological Objections, p. 22, Footnote 35: Hurtado, One God, One Lord, 45.

Not only do some of these terms originate in the Hebrew bible, but some are directly applied to Jesus by New Testament authors. The presence of such general (but not identical) ideas in Philo and the New Testament suggests a wider origin in Jewish culture at that time from which both Philo and New Testament writers could draw. As Segal explains, Philo’s writings attest to both the scriptural basis and commonness of these Jewish beliefs.

It is not too much to suppose that some kind of argument about contrasting manifestations of God in different theophany texts was known to Philo and used by him but that it was later opposed by the rabbis who called other people who espoused that kind of argument “two powers” heretics. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 43

In this case, the helper is called Adam, but the concept of a divine helper is not unlike the idea that Wisdom or the logos was God’s agent in creation. In fact, Philo sometimes claims that the logos is identical to the primal man, on the basis of Gen. 1:26. 14 [Footnote 14: See Conf. 146 and Leg. All. i 43.] At any rate, these reports seem to reflect the actual beliefs of various Jewish groups, which are evidenced in extra-rabbinic reports long before we can ascertain their presence from rabbinic literature. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 114

But Philo’s arguments will give us a good inkling of the kinds of traditions which must have been current in the Hellenistic Jewish communities of the first century. These traditions set the stage for the rabbinic opposition which we can date with surety only to the early second century but have suspected to have been earlier still. The rabbis too must have known of two different types of traditions about divine providence. In the first, a principal angel was seen as God’s primary or sole helper and allowed to share in God’s divinity. That a human being, as the hero or exemplar of a particular group, could ascend to become one with this figure – as Enoch, Moses or Elijah had – seem also to have been part of the tradition. In a second tradition, the qualities of divine mercy and justice were hypostasized attributes of the names of God and described the states on the journey to God. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 180

To anticipate only a fraction of the evidence, Philo attests to the pervasiveness and antiquity of the problem of God’s appearance and His different aspects. Since Philo states that he relies on ancient Jewish tradition, his writings, including those pertaining to the exegesis of the names of God, may indicate the antiquity of the tradition. That Philo knows the issue suggests a possible origin well before the birth of Jesus. But Philo’s writing suggests more than a continuing issue. He employs very similar scriptures and suggests the existence of widespread scriptural traditions, since the rabbis, a century later, know nothing of him directly and are not indebted to him for their exegesis. Yet Philo and the rabbis independently interpret the different names of God both as signifying different figures and as symbolizing His attributes. Preliminary indications are, therefore, that many parts of the Jewish community in various places and periods used the traditions which the rabbis claim is an heretical conception of the deity. Although we shall see that Philo uses both traditions about different manifestations of God and traditions about His contrasting attributes in his exegetical discussions, the rabbis emphasize the latter and warn against the former. We can see how the two different manifestations of God present in Daniel’s vision might trouble the rabbis. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 43

As Segal notes in the quotes above, not all of Philo’s ideas about God and the Logos would have been considered problematic the rabbis. Remember, as we established early on in this study, Philo’s writing predates rabbinic Judaism and the later rabbinic condemnation of these widespread Jewish ideas about God. So, at the time Philo is writing, we do not now  whether or not any Jewish groups would have officially considered these ideas heretical or contrary to monotheism. But the most interesting element concerns those traditions that even the rabbis did not object to. And as Segal points out, turning aspects or attributes of God into personal hypostases based on exegesis of the Hebrew bible was not something that the rabbis objected to at least not in the earliest rabbinic texts.

We will see more on this later. But in the quote below, Segal describes how, rather than being rejected by the rabbis, some of Philo’s ideas about the angel of YHWH and Logos actually parallel ideas accepted by the rabbis. Notice that Segal provides the criteria used by the rabbis to determine if a particular view was heretical or not. If the hypostasis is viewed as an independent deity or creature elevated to godhood, then the rabbis rejected it. But if a concept (such as the memra or shekhina) was not viewed as an independent and separate being, the rabbis not only accepted but at times employed such concepts. In fact, in the first quote below, Segal also candidly states that whether or not a particular concept of a mediating divine figure was heretic was “partly a matter of individual opinion,” which means that it cannot be label unorthodox (at least prior to that point in Jewish history). Also, it should not be overlooked that Segal also notes that Philo’s understanding of the Logos is similar to later rabbinic teaching about the “shekhinah” and that both concepts are used to discuss the same passages in the Hebrew Bible. Neither Philo, nor the rabbis thought their respective concepts of the hypostasized Logos or personified “shekhinah” constituted a compromise of biblical, Jewish monotheism. Lastly, Segal links Philo’s Logos with the “angel of YHWH,” “Memra,” and “shekhinah” traditions that have all been intricately connected to Jewish articulations of Complex Monotheism prior to the third century AD and originated from contemplating revelations contained in the Hebrew Bible itself. Based on these texts Segal concludes that it is illegitimate to project rabbinical conceptions of heresy which aren’t apparent until the second-century AD backwards onto pre-rabbinic Judaism.

Philo understood the descriptions of the “angel of YHWH” in scripture, together with other passages which the rabbis found dangerous, as references to the logos or one of the two principal powers of God. Based on Philonic evidence, we should expect traditions about mediator and principal angels to appear in other writings contemporary to Philo. However, the variety of conceptions about mediators and principal angels in intertestamental documents can only be summarized with difficulty, for the characteristics and names of the mediator differ widely in each document, suggesting that no single consistent myth underlies the whole…Certainly not all the figures related to the scriptures under consideration can be automatically included in the heresy. For instance, we have already seen that many angels and mediators appear in rabbinic literature where they add color to midrashic stories but where they could not be considered heretical….To start with, these general considerations help us remove some obvious phenomena from consideration as heresy. Memra, yekara and shekhinah are used in the targumim and midrash in reference to the dangerous passages to denote the presence of God. But they are never clearly defined as independent creatures. It rather appears that rabbinic concepts of memra, shekhina, yekara avoid the implications of independent divinity and possibly are meant to combat them. We also know that Philo even saw “the Word” or logos as an angel. But there is nothing inherently heretical about such descriptions. It may be anachronistic to apply second century rabbinic categories of heresy to earlier phenomena. The best we can say is that ideas like this might have been seen as heretical in some contexts. More importantly they certainly formed the background out of which heresy arose. Of course from the survey of rabbinic documents and Philo, we know that the judgment that a particular conception of mediation violated the canons of monotheism was also partly a matter of individual opinion. Philo could even use the phrase “second God” to describe the logos without thinking that he had violated the monotheistic basis of his religion….Clearly some of the same issues which Philo discussed were important in first century Palestine as well…even Philo, who was not adverse to the designation “second God” and who describes the logos as God’s agent manifestation in creation, denies that God had help from assistants in creating. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 182-183

Since the Christian messiah may have been a target of the “two powers” polemic, other mediating or intermediary divine helpers in Jewish tradition may also have offended rabbinic sensibilities. The Aramaic terms Yeqara, Memra, and Shekhinah could be included in the heresy to the extent that they were not verbal subterfuges and point to a metaphysical or theological conception.…Many scholars have pointed out that Philo’s conception of logos is intimately related to other Hellenistic Jewish traditions about the figure of Wisdom, the name of God, and the great archangel that mediated at the Sinai theophany. It is possible that underlying Philo’s philosophical language are exegetical traditions which he shares with many other Jews. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 23-24

In the quote below, Segal provides a specific example in which Philo seems to explain his idea of the Logos in terms of aspects of God, particularly justice and mercy.

Elsewhere Philo refers to other texts which were seen by the rabbis to be dangerous because they could imply a plurality of deities: Gen 11:7 (“Come let us go down to confuse their language”), Gen. 3:22 (Behold Adam has become as one of us”), and Gen. 1:26 are mentioned. Philo maintains that one of God’s two powers descends – in one case, to create man; in another, to punish those building the tower. He explains that these powers are angels and that their presence has so impressed some people (even Moses) that they feel no shame in calling them gods. In other words, Philo depends on his concept of the powers of justice and mercy to explain scriptural plurals, calling them both angels and divine. Therefore in On the Change of Names, Philo can offer another interpretation of what the patriarch saw when scripture says they saw God. (6-7). First, he remarks that they saw the same creative power of God which Moses saw on Sinai for the first time, having already been privileged to see God’s ruling power. We remember that he has previously said that the elders saw the image of God or the logos. Of course, the two interpretations are not entirely consistent. Yet here, they are not entirely contradictory, for both the logos and the powers represent summations of all God’s emanations. Since Moses has already known the lesser of God’s powers, seeing the higher power as well can be equivalent to seeing the logos, the sum of all the powers. Again we note the same exegesis as the Mekhilta records in rabbinic lore a century later. This time Philo provides a witness to the doctrine which the rabbis defend, instead of one they condemn. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 176-177

According to Segal, the rabbis would have identified such concepts as suggesting plurality undoubtedly because they depict not only the figure of God but also two distinguishable hypostases of God (one as a personal manifestation of God’s attribute of justice, the other God’s mercy). However, ultimately Segal concludes that rabbinic texts also use the same exegesis to derive the same conclusion that there were multiple emanations of God and the Logos was equivalent to the sum of all those emanations. While this is by no means equivalent to the Christian Trinity and differs in some important respects, this rabbinic text does embrace as monotheistic a foundational concept shared by the Trinity that later rabbinic Judaism would claim was always heretical: the idea of a single divine Being with a plurality of aspects that could be present at different times in multiple figures.

At this point, we can examine a variety of sources that relate to Philo and all of which attest to the widespread nature of such Complex Monotheistic ideas as we sometimes find in Philo. The first stop along the way is the Septuagint, a Greek translation of the Hebrew bible written between approximately 250-130 BC. The date of this translation is important because it predates both Philo and Jesus and, therefore, reflects ideas common to the Jewish community before either of these two figures. As Segal notes in the quote below, this Greek translation of the Hebrew bible depicted “the entire angelic theophany” in Exodus and possibly Genesis as “a close unit.” Philo’s identification that both Moses and Abraham were visited by the same figure was derived from such pre-existing Jewish traditions, which are preserved in concrete form in the Septuagint.

Thus, at the very least, the entire angelic theophany in Exodus (and maybe those in Genesis as well) was seen as a close unit as early as LXX translations in the second century B.C.E. Philo shared and developed this perspective in striking ways. Philo wants the logos, the goal of the mystical vision of God, to serve as a simple explanation for all the angelic and human manifestations of the divine in the Old Testament. Thus Philo hints that, at the burning bush, Moses saw the image of Being, but elsewhere he calls it an angel as the scripture requires. Whatever is implied about the status of the tradition at the time of the LXX translation, this angelic manifestation of God is so consistent a character in the biblical drama for Philo that he blithely applies the description of the angel Moses saw to the angel that appears to Abraham. Again the link is made on the basis of place. (Gen. 28:11): For as long as he falls short of perfection, he has the Divine Word as his leader, since there is an oracle which says, “Lo I send my messenger before thy face to guard thee in thy way, that he may bring you into the land which I have prepared for thee; give heed to him and hearken to him, disobey him not; for he will by no means withdraw from you. For My name is in him.” (Ex. 23:30 f.) – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 169-170

But not only does the Septuagint exemplify that Jews were commonly connecting all these visitations as the same figure, but it was known that this figure “carries ‘the name of God.’” It is on the basis of these widespread Jewish ideas that Philo can “refer to YHWH as the logos” and “can also interpret other occurrences of YHWH in scripture to indicate the presence of an angel, not God.” Segal goes on to provide a list of Hebrew texts which identify YHWH God as this visiting angel and vice versa. This demonstrates once again not only that at least part of Philo’s ideology is derived from Hebrew texts, but also that Philo and the Septuagint reflect the presence of these ideas within the Jewish community for centuries before Christianity and Philo.

It seems likely that the tradition of a single angelic messenger can be traced to the LXX itself but it is well developed by Philo. Furthermore, this angel is a creature who carries “the name of God”, as scripture says (Ex. 23:21). This is the same scripture that the rabbis found so easily misinterpreted. But not only can Philo refer to YHWH as the logos, he can also interpret other occurrences of YHWH in scripture to indicate the presence of an angel, not God. For instance, the Lord (YHWH) standing on top of Jacob’s ladder (Gen. 28:13) is identified as the archangel, the logos. Such ideas are facilitated by (and, in fact, probably mean to explain) a certain amount of confusion in the biblical narratives as to whether God himself or an angel appears. 28 (Footnote 28: Such confusion is usually explained by modern exegetes as due to differences between J and E sources of the Bible. Confusion between the angel of YHWH and God himself can be seen in Gen. 16:7 f., 21:17 f., 22:11, 31:11 f.,; Ex. 3:2 f., Ju. 2:1 f. as well as Ex. 23:21 f. which the rabbis discuss.) – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 170

The widespread nature of these Jewish beliefs can also be seen in the correspondence between Philo and Justin Martyr. Justin was a Christian apologist and writer who lived between 100-165 AD.

Justin Martyr – Saint Justin Martyr c.AD 100-c.AD 165, Christian apologist…– Columbia Encyclopedia

As Segal states, the similarity of Justin and Philo’s identification of the Logos with the angel of YHWH figure in the Hebrew Bible demonstrates that these traditions were quite common in the theology of Judaism in the first and early second century BC.

Since Justin understands the appearance of God in Jacob’s dreams, wrestlings and even at the burning bush as a single consistent figure, he is able to promote both the independent personality of the being manifested and his divine nature. Like Philo Justin calls the logos another God (heteros theos), distinct in number, if not in essence. (ch. 56). The sharply drawn personality of this manifestation (together with the doctrine of the incarnation) is the element which most distinguished Justin’s concept of logos from Philo’s. But, as Goodenough has persuasively argued, both Justin and Philo should be seen as evidencing examples of the same Hellenistic Jewish traditions. 16 [Footnote 16: E. R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p. 147 f.] – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 223

As further evidence that these traditions had a background in Hellenistic Judaism before they were put to Christian use, Goodenough shows that most of the titles applied to the logos by Justin are the same as those used by Philo and other Hellenstic Jewish writers: theos, kyrios, angelos, dynamis, anatole, litha, petra, arche, hemera (phos), sophia, aner, anthropos, Israel, Jacob, etc.: 17 [Footnote 17: E. R. Goodenough, The Theology of Justin Martyr, p. 168-172.] – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 223-224

[Regarding Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, chapter 56] It is a Jew, not Justin, who admits that another divine being, “The Lord,” was present at the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and that this divine being was different from God. From our previous discussion, there is no reason to doubt that such heterodox Jews existed as early as Philo. Justin only endeavored to prove that this second divinity is the Christ. It is significant that the angelic figure is accepted by the Jew – only his messianic status is questioned. This is another piece of evidence that Christianity was the first to connect the messiah and the principal angel. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 222

To substantiate the claim of the logos’s primacy in the divine economy, Justin points to the grammatical plural referring to God in Gen. 1:26 and Gen. 3:22. After this he adduces passages to support the incarnation from the virgin birth to the ascension. Of course, the argument is not well received by his Jewish opponents, even those who admitted the existence of a second power, and Justin is forced to emphasize his argument by coming at essentially the same scripture from a variety of different perspectives. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 223-224

As indicated by the last two quotes above, one of Justin’s writings contains his account of an exchange he had with a non-Christian Jew named Trypho. When discussing this work, Segal notes that even Justin’s Jewish opponents had no objection to Justin’s identification of the angel of YHWH (Logos) figure as God and yet as distinct from God.

Other evidence of these fundament features of Complex Monotheism in pre-rabbinic Judaism comes from the Prayer of Joseph. In the quote below, Segal explains that this first or second century (AD) Jewish writing includes the same ideas that he has documented in Philo’s writings. Again, Segal notes the commonplace nature of these types of beliefs in Judaism and that these beliefs originate from an exegesis of the biblical texts themselves.

A most interesting example of heterodox Judaism has been preserved in the “Prayer of Joseph,” which is contained in Origen’s commentary on John 2:31. 51 [Footnote 51: Jonathan Z. Smith, “The Prayer of Joseph,” in Religions in Antiquity.] Though only a short fragment of the total work is recorded, almost all of the themes which we have been tracing since Philo are present in it. It is based on the theophany texts of Genesis which deal with Jacob’s exploitations and possibly is part of the testimony genre of literature which as been preserved in the name of other patriarchs…Although this material is contained in a Christian source, no doubt its origin was Jewish sectarianism. Nor is it the only evidence that traditions about angelic keepers of the divine name were common in Jewish-Christianity. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 199-200

Another example comes from a comparison of Philo to the Targum Neofiti. Earlier we saw a quote in which Philo identifies the person of God who created man as the Logos of YHWH.

16. Although Philo spoke of the logos more than fourteen hundred times in his writings, there are a few examples that are especially important. To quote New Testament scholar Larry Hurtado: Philo calls the Logos “the second god” (ton deuteron theon) and states that the “God” in whose image Adam was created in Gen 1:27 is actually the Logos, which the rational part of the soul resembles. It is impossible (according to Philo) to think of anything earthly being a direct image of God himself…[and] Philo also calls the Logos “mediator” (mesites). 34 – Brown, Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus, Volume 2, Theological Objections, p. 22

Philo’s identification parallels the Targum Neofiti’s assertion that man was created in the image of the Memra of God. Targum Neofiti is a Jewish translation of the Hebrew Bible into Aramaic written between the first and fourth centuries AD. As stated previously, the Greek word Logos and the Aramaic word Memra are synonymous terms. They both are the equivalent of the English term “Word.”

Targum Neofiti – Neofiti's date of origin is uncertain. However, the manuscript's colophon dates the copy to 1504 CE. Díez Macho argues that Neofiti dated to the first century CE as part of a pre-Christian textual tradition, based upon anti-halakhic material, early geographical and historical terms, New Testament parallels, Greek and Latin words, and some supposedly pre-masoretic Hebrew text. Martin McNamara argues that Neofiti originated in the fourth century CE.[1] The language of the Targum Neophyti is conventionally known as "Palestinian Aramaic" as opposed to the "Babylonian Aramaic" of the Targum Onkelos. – wikipedia.org

14. In fact, according to Targum Neofiti, representing important, early traditions, man was created in the image of the Memra’ of the Lord! – Brown, Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus, Volume 2, Theological Objections, p. 21

Below Segal comments specifically on how the idea that man was created in the image of the Word demonstrates that “‘son of man’ traditions preceded the gospels” and included “pre-Christian” traditions involving an exegesis of Daniel 7:13 as referencing “God’s human hypostasis.” And once again, the basis of the belief is attributed to passages in the Hebrew Bible.

Of course, Philo does describe the heavenly Adam in terms which are elsewhere used of the “son of man.” He also evidences similar ideas about the heavenly logos. So we must allow that some sort of “son of man” traditions preceded the gospels. It would not be surprising to find that the pre-Christian traditions were a variety of conflicting exegeses of Dan. 7:13, all describing an unnamed figure, possibly God’s human hypostasis or a principal angel who carries the name of God. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 204

More generally speaking, the quote below (which we have seen earlier) demonstrates that by the time of rabbinical Judaism concepts of such “God’s human hypostasis” or a “manlike figure” enthroned next to God were prevalent in several groups of pre-rabbinic Jews including Philo, Christians, apocalyptists, and mystics.

By the end of the second century, at least two different kinds of heretics were opposed in rabbinic polemic. The earliest polemic was designed to counter apocalyptic, mystical or Christian identification of a manlike figure enthroned as judge next to God, as described in various epiphany texts. The second to emerge involved the claim that the creator was ignorant of a higher god and that there as a complete separation of divine mercy from divine justice, even to the extent of making them properties of two different gods. The first tradition could be seen as early as Philo in Hellenistic Judaism and was continuously employed by mystics, apocalyptists and Christians. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 244

Lastly, we have already taken note that rabbinic concepts of the memra and shekhinah as well as rabbinic texts such as the Mekhilta exhibit distinct hypostases of God that are not separate beings. Likewise, not only can we list non-rabbinic groups as accepting such ideas, but we can also include early, second-century, rabbinic figures like Rabbi Akiba in this list of Jewish sectarians who subscribed to the belief in a divine, man-like, hypostasis of YHWH.

Rabbi Akiba (110-135 C.E.) affirms the possibility, stating that the other throne was for David. Akiba must be identifying the “son of man” with the Davidic messiah. Nor was R. Akiba alone in the rabbinic movement in identifying the figure in heaven as the messiah. There is some evidence that Judaism contained other traditions linking these verses in Daniel with the messiah. However plausible R. Akiba’s interpretation, it is opposed by his colleague, R. Yosi, who explicitly states that the throne is for a divine rather than a messianic figure. It is not clear that Akiba would have seen the two categories as contradictory. Yet, the outcome of that controversy was that R. Akiba agreed that the two thrones in heaven should symbolize the two aspects of God’s providence – His mercy and His justice. God is viewed as sitting on one throne when judging mercifully and on the other when judging by strict justice. It is significant that a central figure in the rabbinic movement like R. Akiba was alleged to have proposed messianic interpretations of Daniel 7:9. Ironically he subsequently reconsidered those opinions by substituting an opinion in which both figures in heaven were seen to be divine, one God in two hypostases. – Alan F. Segal, Two Powers in Heaven, p. 47-49

This means that Jewish belief in a man-like, hypostatic person of YHWH who served in a mediatory or messianic role spanned the gamut of early Judaism including all of the various sects of the religion including: Jewish apocalyptists, Jewish Christians, Jewish mystics, Jewish, Hellenistic philosophers (like Philo), and even early prominent Pharisaic rabbis like Akiba. Moreover, all of these sects used the same biblical passages to derive their shared Complex Monotheistic beliefs. The exegetical origin and universal presence of these beliefs in all sections of Judaism prior to the close of the second century AD demonstrates their authentically Jewish and biblical nature.

As we close this section, it is important to repeat a few important observations.

First, we have examined the historical evidence that demonstrates the presence of the Complex Monotheism in the Hebrew Bible itself in the period of Biblical Judaism (2000-400 BC.) Likewise, we have seen a large amount of historical evidence that the Complex Monotheism of Biblical Judaism remained intact in the pre-rabbinic and early rabbinic periods up until at least the middle of the second century AD. The widespread nature of Judaism’s belief that the one, true God had revealed himself as more than one, simultaneously-existing, hypostatic person is established through the texts of various Jewish sources in that period. These sources include: rabbinic sources such as Rabbi Akiba in the Talmud, Philo of Alexandria, the New Testament, and the writings of other inter-testamental, apocalyptic, and mystical Jewish groups. In other words, Complex Monotheistic beliefs seem to be universally present (or nearly so) within all sects of Judaism prior to the close of the second century AD.

Second, we should keep in mind that while Segal identifies the presence of Complex Monotheism in various Jewish writers during the Hellenistic period, his investigation does not extend further back into history. However, as we have seen earlier in this study, an inquiry into the origin of the key components of Complex Monotheism demonstrates that these foundational ingredients were promulgated within the Hebrew scripture itself as well as the ancient Semitic world long before they were ever expressed by the Greek philosophical schools. Biblical scholars and religious historians like Sommer have traced these ideas chronologically to their sources. As we have seen, the historical evidence confirms the origin of Jewish Complex Monotheism within the Hebrew Bible during the period of Biblical Judaism (2000-400 BC). And it is the Hebrew Bible itself, rather than later Hellenistic works, which pre-rabbinic and early rabbinic Jewish sects and theologians identified to as the source of those beliefs and turned to as the guide for how to understand them.

Third, Jewish Simple Monotheism cannot necessarily make the same claim. On the contrary, while Complex Monotheism within Judaism can be documented prior to Greek philosophy, so far we have only seen Simple Monotheism expressed within Jewish sources after Greek philosophy articulates the distinguishing concepts of Simple Monotheism. (We will provide further discussion of the potential presence of Simple Monotheism within pre-rabbinic Judaism later in this study.)

As we conclude this section, we should make a few additional comments on the significance and frequency of these Jewish beliefs in relation to the New Testament. Specifically, it is worth noting that the prevalence of Complex Monotheism within pre-rabbinic Judaism as well as the foundational concepts and identifications of the hypostatic persons of YHWH explains the treatment of Complex Monotheism in the New Testament itself. When we first encounter Complex Monotheism in the New Testament, it is not accompanied by an explanation. Likewise, the titles associated with the persons of God are not accompanied by explanation. On the contrary, the Jewish authors of the New Testament treat Complex Monotheism and the titles for the persons of YHWH as if they need no explanation. For these Jewish authors, the fundamental concepts and titles of Complex Monotheism are already familiar and understood by both themselves and their audiences. The familiarity and lack of introductory explanation is exactly what we would expect once we recognize the historical reality of first-century Judaism. Jews in Palestine needed no introduction or explanation of these things, because they weren’t new to them. They weren’t foreign or novel concepts they were learning about or talking about for the first time. On the contrary, they were long-standing and well-known facets of the existing Jewish, monotheistic, biblical concept of God.